Entrada curta apenas para chamar à atenção sobre um artigo de um dos mais conhecidos e fervorosos adeptos dos crimes de guerra ‘made in USA’ que o nosso país tem a infelicidade de ter, José Manuel Fernandes, que no jornal Público e posteriormente no blog Blasfémias escreveu sobre os tristes acontecimentos que ocorreram a 6 de Agosto de 1945, a detonação de duas armas nucleares por parte dos EUA nas cidades japonesas de Nagasaki e Hiroshima.
JMF continua a achar que houve justificação para semelhante acto, cobarde e criminoso.
Para avaliar a decisão de Harry Truman de bombardear Hiroshima (há exactamente 65 anos) não basta tomarmos como referência o que hoje sabemos sobre a bomba atómica e os seus efeitos: temos de procurar perceber o que foi a II Guerra Mundial, o seu caracter único de “guerra total e absoluta” e o que se julgava estar em jogo se o Japão não capitulasse rapidamente e sem condições
*texto editado a 6 de Agosto de 2005 no Público. Um texto que o dr. Jaime Gama me aconselhou a não escrever…
Aqui fica o que escrevi na entrada do Blasfémias:
Para não ser acusado de anti-americanismo deixo por conta de cidadãos tão ilustres quanto Dwight Eisenhower e William Leahy , a demonstração de como aqueles dois actos não foram mais que crimes contra a humanidade e que quem os cometeu deveria ter sido julgado da mesma forma que os NAZIS o foram.
Convém ainda questionar porque razão foram escolhidas as duas cidades que não tinham até aquela altura sofrido qualquer bombardeamento e a razão é muito simples, ou melhor as razões:
1º havia que mostrar aos soviéticos que os EUA tinham no seu arsenal uma poderosíssima arma capaz de fazer desaparecer por completo uma cidade e isso só seria possível de demonstrar atacando uma que estivesse de pé;
2º nada se sabia das consequências de uma arma destas, nomeadamente para o meio ambiente, para as pessoas e até do seu poder destrutivo apesar do teste levado a cabo no Projeto Manhattan com a trinity, logo havia que testar.
“…the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.” – Dwight Eisenhower – Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63
“…in [July] 1945… Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. …the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.
“During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face’. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude…” – Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380
“It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. ” – “The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.” – William Leahy, Chief of Staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman – I Was There, pg. 441.
E para terminar deixo este interessante artigo do jornalista John Pielger.
“The National Archives in Washington contain US government documents that chart Japanese peace overtures as early as 1943. None was pursued. A cable sent on May 5, 1945 by the German ambassador in Tokyo and intercepted by the US dispels any doubt that the Japanese were desperate to sue for peace, including “capitulation even if the terms were hard”. Instead, the US secretary of war, Henry Stimson, told President Truman he was “fearful” that the US air force would have Japan so “bombed out” that the new weapon would not be able “to show its strength”. He later admitted that “no effort was made, and none was seriously considered, to achieve surrender merely in order not to have to use the bomb”. His foreign policy colleagues were eager “to browbeat the Russians with the bomb held rather ostentatiously on our hip”. General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project that made the bomb, testified: “There was never any illusion on my part that Russia was our enemy, and that the project was conducted on that basis.” The day after Hiroshima was obliterated, President Truman voiced his satisfaction with the “overwhelming success” of “the experiment”.”
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